Antitrust Guideposts for B2B Electronic Marketplaces by Greene, Hillary & Levine, Gail F.
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Faculty Articles and Papers School of Law 
2000 
Antitrust Guideposts for B2B Electronic Marketplaces 
Hillary Greene 
University of Connecticut School of Law 
Gail F. Levine 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_papers 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Greene, Hillary and Levine, Gail F., "Antitrust Guideposts for B2B Electronic Marketplaces" (2000). Faculty 
Articles and Papers. 480. 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_papers/480 
COVER STORIES
Antitrust Guideposts
for B2B Electronic
Marketplaces
BY GAIL F. LEVINE AND HILLARY GREENE
NTITRUST MAGAZINE'S DEDICATION
, of this issue to business-to-business electronic
/ \ markerplaces (13213s) could hardly have been
m\rore timely, B121is connect businesses via the
I/ \Internet, and they exemplify both how tech-
ilolugy enahles business to collaborate in new ways and
how the inpulse to collaborate drives development of new
technology.
As this issue of ANrTItUST demonstrates, there is
immense anticipation of how antitrust law will address the
questions B2Bs pose. Businesspeople, legal scholars, tech-
nologists, economists, and others who know the 112B terrain
debated many potential antitrust issues during the Federal
Trade Commission's public workshop on B2Bs in June 2000,'
and the staff of the FTC issued a report in October 2000 dis-
cussing the issues addressed during the workshop. This arti-
cle reflects and draws on that discussion.
828s can become impressive engines of efficiency and
competition, dramatically reducing costs and even making
some markets more competitive. B2Bs are nor, of course,
immune from anticompetitive concerns, but they can he set
up and run so as to mini mize their antitrust risk 'l'oward that
end, we highlight some of the key concerns that may arise
while counseling B2Bs or their participants. We raise more
questions than we answer, but in so doing we outline sone
of the antitrust issues that may arise.
Basics of B2Bs
At the heart of B211 electronic marketplaces is technology
that promotes new methods of communication between
businesses. That communication, in turn, facilitates new
relationships between businesses. Many buyers and sellers
Gld F Levine is the Assistant Director for Policy Planing ai the Federal
Trtade Curninglsaiori, and Hillary Gre v"a is on uilorcy i' Policy Planning
s Ihi Federal rrado Commission. Those remarks are those of tho
athoIs alone, and tey do not necossolly tofleet ho views of the
Fevcoral trade Commission or any Commissionor.
now deal with each other by phone or fax, or perhaps via elec-
trunic data interchange (F.DIJ systems. But phone and fax
transactions can lead to cusly clcrial crrors, and EDI systcms
are somewhat limited and definitely expensive.
The Interner has made it less expensive for buyers and sell-
ers to connect with each other: more firms can more readily
access each other, and once connected, they can send more
and inore content to Cad other quickly. In short, I nternet-
based communications have permitted the recent explosion
of 13211 electronic markerplaces.
Do competitors have to collaborate, via B2Bs, to capture
the efficiencies of trading on the Ilnternct? The answer is not
yet clear. Rather than participate in B2Bs, sonic companies
arc chosing to benefit from tie Internet through establish-
ing their own private network Ibr communications with their
suppliers.
But for the countless businesses foring or considerinig
forming B2Bs, these online business collaborations are
incredibly diverse. As was immediately apparent at the FTC
workshop, both the structure and function of B2Bs reflects
a multitudc of' flacors beyond technology. Those factors
include which good, are traded, what pricing mnechanism is
used, and how the B2B is organiaed. We oudine each in
turn.
Goods Traded. B2Bs serve a broad array of industries,
frora metals to produce to chemicals to energy to engineered
goods. B211s can be Used to buy and sell everything from
indirect goods, like pens and janitorial services, 10 direct
goods, like the motors that a B213 buyer installs into the
machinery it manufactures. B2Bs can be used to trade goods
which have offline marketplaces. B2Bs can be used to pur-
chase though long-turmi contracts, such as for custom-made
electronics devices, or on an ad-hoc basis, such as For bulk
chemicals to cover an unexpected shortfall, Moreover, B2Bs
can provide a marketplace for goods that might not otherwise
have a viable sales channel. For example, a 132B can match
those looking to have small loads hauled with trucks having
excess capacity and heading their way
Pricing Mechanisms. Likewise, B2Bs can establish prices
in a variety of different ways: by catalog, by a bid-ask system,
by auction, or by other means. While the technology enables
online prices to be set in a manner closely related to their
offline counterparts, the implications of a pricing inecha-
nism for competition may differ between online and oflhinc.
Both online and offline catalogs enumerate the details of
the goods For sale. Being online, however, allows the cre-
ation of metacaralogs that aggregate entries for a single item
from multiple competitors and thus facilitate price compar-
iso0 ,s,
Similarly, a bid-ask system, whether ouline or offline,
involves tie matching ofordcrs and quotes in CiIrcumsIances
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where prices can move up or down. But for soMc commodi-
ties, it is the ability to trade at "Internet speed" that makes a
bid-ask system a viable option.
Auctions assume as many forms online as they do offline.
For example, forward auctions involve buyers bidding agalinsr
one another to purchase a good for sale. Prices move up,
Reverse auctions involve competitive bidding by suppliers to
sell goods to buyers. Prices move down. Online auctions,
however, may include firms participating From locations all
over tile globe; the reduced relevance of geography in online
auctions makes them more attractive fur many businesses.
Organization. Finally, organizational structures vary
among B2Bs. Sometimes B2Bs are owned by companies that
plan to trade on them ("cnsortium 1121s"); sometimes they
are founded by third
Sometines 132Bs are owued by parties who do not plan
to buy and sell on them;
companlies that lhn £0 trade arid sometimes they are
on the?.., sometimes they are founded by a blend of
the two. The implica-founded by third parties who tions are important. For
do not plan to buy and sell on example, some of nur
workshop panelists stat-
them; and sometimes they are ed that ownership inter-
fiuimeled by a blend of the two. est by industry partici-
pants is necessary to
The ipliations are i)prtant, ensure that a B2B has
suficient liquidity and
sufficient funding for the developmnto of software, func-
tionality and the like. Others disagreed and stated that own-
ership by non-industry participants is essential to a 82B
functioning in a fair and neutral manner.
Antitrust and B2Bs
Competition is just as inportant in the burgeoning online
marketplaces and in the product markets they serve as it has
always been in the offline world. Indeed, the centrality of
ensuring a competitive marketplace was a key point of agree-
ment among many of the panelists in the FTC's B2B work-
shop.
Many panelists agreed that 1328s pose familiar, though
sometimes difficult, antitrust questions. The real test is how
to apply the law to the new ficts this emerging technology
creates. Do B2Bs permit information-sharing among rivals,
and if so, what information and under what circumstances?
Do they facilitate joint purchasing at market share levels
high enough to raise concern? Do they exclude the rivals of
their nwner-participants, and if so, under what circtn-
stances? Do they compel participants to lbrsake rival B2Bs?'
The starting point of' the analysis are the Antitrust
Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, which
the FTC and tile Department of Justice issued jointly in
April 2000.' Those guidelines state, in general terns, the
Agencies' approach to analyz.ing competior coilaborations.
These guidelines, standing alone, do not provide all of tile
answers. Antitrust analysis is by its very nature heavily fact-
dependent, and each B2B will present its own unique set of
circumstances for analysis. Nonetheless, the general contours
of electronic marketplaces are sufficiently well-established
that certain lines of inquiry suggest themselves.
Information Exchange
Information exchange anmong B211 buyers or sellers could
promote competition and efficiency in the markets for the
goods bought and sold in B213s. By reducing search costs,
B2Bs can help buyers save money by making it easier to
handle more bids more quickly, to coniparison-shop, or to
find more suppliers. They can likewise help sellers by pro-
viding greater and cheaper access to nore potential CUs-
toners. In B2Bs where catalogs aggregate prices and other
information, buyers can, with a few mouse clicks, compare
the prices of several vendors of a given product. Ini some
B213s that host reverse auctions, a buyer can invite sellers
across the globe to bid against each other for its business; like-
wise, sellers can auction off used machinery in 11211s that
allow them to reach more potential buyers than before. This
greater price transparency can greatly enhance comnpetition in
the market fur goods traded on the exchange, and result in
lower prices for consumers.
Likewise, B2Bs can dramatically reduce the administrative
costs of buying and selling between businesses. The current
phone arid f(x method that sonie firms use takes its toll both
ill ter'11s oftulnC anLI accuracy. Inrcrnt-based transmission of
such deals can dramatically reduce both costs. In fact,
decreasing administrative costs may be the most immediate
and pervasive effect of 132Bs.
Moreover, 11211s have the potential to let suplpliers all
along tile supply chain know what the buyer wants and
when, reducing inventory costs and delays. The process can
become even more streamlined for those businesses with
enterprise resource planning systems, which mny be con-
nected to a B2B3o that the buyer's internal inventory system
can more seanlessly convey its needs as they arise. This, too,
could result in benefits for consumers.
IHlowever, information-shiaring agreements among buyers
or sellers might facilitate anticomnpetitive coordination on
price or other tmatters. Firms in a concentrated industry gen-
erally "know that stable high prices, maintained by all firms,
would benefit [theml all, ' But uncertainty about what each
other is actually doing can frustrate attempts to set such sta-
ble high prices. How is a firm to know that its ptice-hiking
move has been noticed by its rivals, so that they call follow
suit? How can a firm know that its rivals are sticking to tie
pricing arrangement, and not "cheating" by selling at a lower
price?
Firms can overcome such uncertainty through certain
kinds of information-sharing agreements, and participants in
our workshop expressed concerns that B2Bs could become
the vehicles for such information-sharing agreements. For
cxamplc, could B2Bs seller-owners in a concentrated market
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agree to share information abour what they are charging,
and could that lead to their tacit collusion on price? Could
buyer-owners agree to share through the B2B enough ilfor-
marion about their purchases of inputs to lead to tacit collu-
sion oil the priCes they charge for their outputs, or on the
quantity of outputs that they produce? Tacit collusion ott
other matters might become easier too. One group of sup-
pliers, for example, has stated that a B213s buyer-owners
could agree to share information through the 2132 abur
transaction terms such as "payment options, payment dates,
fimancing ternis, and perhaps even warranties," an agreement
that could lead to the "standardization" of those terms.7
Only a look at the facts of a particular 11211 can determine
whether its inlfor afio|n-sharing agreements are likely to
[aciiitatc such collusion, but in doing so, counselurs may
wish to consider certain key factors, none ofwhich is alone
dispositive:
Who is sharing the information? Is tile information being
shared among competitors or non-competitors?
What type of information is being shared? As the Com-
petitor Collaboration Guidelines point out, "[oither things
being equal, the sharing of information relating to price,
output, costs, or strategic planning is more likely to raise
competitive concern than the sharing of information relating
to less competitively sensitive variables." Is the shared infor-
mation merely the sort of dara rhar is already available out-
side the 121? If so, could it be discovered offline as quickly
and easily as through the B2B?
How old is the information? All other things being equal,
sharing contingent or future pricing iif'ormatiorn is gener-
ally more troubling tian sharing information about past
transactions." The enforcenient agencies have encountered
such a sitnation in the past: In 1992, the Departmcn of
Justice charged that some airlines used a fare dissemination
system to collude through a complex scheme that allowed
them to exchange future fare and other information."
Shared information about insrantaneous transactions can
also raise antitrust concerns; for example, frequent, small-
stake online atcrions may allow bidders to adjust their
future bids strategically.
The competitive impact of such inquiries may depend on
whether the markets the B213 serves are susceptible to collu-
sion. How concentrated is the relevant marker? What share
of the market is controlled by the information-sharers? All
other things held equal, competitive concerns are greater
where the degree of narket concentration, or the share of the
market conrolled by inibrniatioi-sharers, is greater. Thus,
shared information relating to direct goods is generally more
likely to generate antitrust concern than shared information
relating to indirect goods. This is because the information-
sharers are less likely to dominate the markets for indirect
goods, like office supplies, which many other companies buy.
How high or low are the enty barriers? How hanmogenCous
arc the products or firms within the market? How advanta-
geous would it be fur a firn| to cheat on a price-fixing deal?
Answers to such questions help determine whether the mar-
ket is generally susceptible to collusion in rhe first place.'
If the hared information at issue appears to have the
potential to fihcilitate collusion in a relvvant market, the qucs-
tion becomes whether the 1213 is choosing to allow infor-
mration to be shared because there are import;ant CeffciCrciCs
at stake. Could firewalls or other measures such as the mask-
ing of select information preserve those efficiencies and elim-
inate orat least reduce the collusion risks? Our workshop par-
ticipants proposed a number of possible measures to address
information-sharing concerns. For example, a B2B may keep
certain information away from certain participants in online
auctions or catalogs, employ nondisclosure and confiden-
tiality agreements, keep sensitive information from board
mcmbcrs or other 132B wurkcr employed by 1321 partici-
pants, have their operating rule compliance audited, or exact
penalties for the violation of 1121 operating rules.
Exclusivity
Just as information sharing and group buying could affect tile
markets for goods traded on 13213s, exclusivity practices-
practices that "keep insiders in" a 13213-could threaten or
enhance competition among the B2Bs themselves.
Ir is easy to see why a 128 would want to attract partici-
pants to itself and keeIp them there. Firsr, 9213s need ennugh
trading volume to cover their costs. Second, buyers generally
want to trade on an exchange that allows them to reach the
most sellers in their market, and vice versa. Such network
Iow old is thi injin'malion? /I other things bring rqual
sharing (od tingent or.future pricing inf-;oation is
gearall;' ware tro ublig than sharing informav tin
about /mat tranartwus.
effects, comhined with the need for B2]ls to cover their costs,
have the potential to rip the marker in favor ofa reduced nun-
ber of narketplaces. The race to get the necessary volume can
be particularly keen now as B23s are forming. Newly form-
ing B2Bs often find themselves in a crowded field, and they
must show their participants (and financial backers) that they
will indeed attract and keep enough volume to survive.
These factors heat up the race for volume, encouraging
some B213s to employ exclusivity strategies designed to attract
and keep participants. Some lure buyers and sellers with pos-
irive inducements to promote particpation-or "carrots"-
such as ofkring equity interests, rebates, or revenue-sharing
in exchange for volume, For example, by offering their
founders equity in the exchange, a consortium 82B may give
those founders a financial incentive to bring their volume to
the exchange. In addition to such "carrots," B2Bs may also
bratdish "sticks," or disincentives designed to deter partici-
pants From leaving. These include mininium voLutie or other
requirements, restrictions on participation or investineit iii
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other 1328s, and "benign coercion," the term one workshop
panelist used to describe the pressure that a 13213's strong
backers exert upon their trading partners to induce partici-
pation in the B2B. (11h line between sticks and carrots is a
fine one at best, since an inducement can sometimes shade
into a threat, and vice vcrsa.)These practices impose switch-
ing costs; they exact penalties or withhold benefits ifa buyer
or seller uses another 1213.
Exclusivity practices may well be pro.oripctitive in the
right circumstances. Indeed, some workshop panelists stated
that such practices may be reasonably necessary to persuade
investors iha a new-enirant B211 will attract and keep
enough trading volume to be viable.' Aid B2Bs that win vol-
umc for thetnselvcs on their merits are laudable.
But a competitive concern arises when a B2B uses exclu-
sivity tactics-and not its merits-to attract almost all the
volume and leave too little for any rival marketplace to sur-
vive. Under that extreme worst-case scenario, the marker for
a particular good could be dominated by a single 1213, which
might then abuse its market power. It might then charge
more, offer fewer scrviccs, or cease innovating and improv-
ing its service without a competitive spur from other mar-
ketplaces.
In short, exclusivity practices can be procomperirive or
anticompetitive, depending on the factual ci reunistans.
The Staff Report sought to ideittily a few analytical guide-
posts: "All tse held equal (including the ability to achieve ef-
ciencies and innovations), competitive concerns are magni-
fied (i) the greater the ntarket share of the 11211 owners; (ii)
the greater the restraints on participation outside the B2B;
and (iii) the less the interoperabiiity with other 23s. .. .On
the other hand, all else held equal (including the level of
likely anticompetitive harm), competitive concerns are
reduced the greater the contribution of exclusivity to achiev-
ing procompetitive henefitrs.""'
Exclusion
Another set of problems tnay arise if a 121's owner-partici-
pants can exclude or discriminate against their rivals so as to
raise the business costs of those excluded rivals and gain for
themselves the power to raise the price of goods for con-
sumers. Under this scenario, concerns about exclusionary
practices-practices that "keep outsiders out" of that 13213-
may arise. Such practices have the potential to affect conpe-
tition, for good or liar ill, in the markets tr goods traded on
the B28.
Excluding firms from a 828 may sometimes make sense.
Excluding companies with poor credit, for example, may be
a helpful way to minimnize the risk that buyers on the
exchange will fail to pay .4
On the other hand, such practices can be used to under-
mine competition as well. Is the seemingly legitimate exclu-
sionary practice a cover fur exclusion on improper grounds?
Is it a way for the participants in a dominant B213 to exclude
buyers or sellers who compete with them? An excluded rival
may also find itself locked our of doing bttsiness with sup-
pliers or customers who are committed to participating
exclusively oti that 132B. Even if the 121's participant-own-
ers let those competitors in, will they do so on discrimina-
tory terms that make it harder for the rivals to provide real
competition? For example, will the B2B's participant-own-
ers set up the 1321 in a way that biases the computerized
display of information in their favor? This has appeared in
earlier forays into electronic commerce: cotMputerited reser-
varion systems owned by various airlines originally "dis-
play[ed] flight information in a way that favor[ed] the ven-
dor airline ... by listing their flights above better flights,"
artificially inflating their desirability.'
Whcthcr a 1321's participant-owners urn do this, ofCourse,
depends on a number of factors. Will the B2B's participants
actually have the power to substantially raise the costs of
excluded rivals? Can the product, or adequate substitutes for
it, be traded comparably elsewhere, online or off? Will new
marketplaces arise, giving excluded rivals a place to trade?
And ifLthe B23's participants do have the power to substan-
tially raise excluded rivals' costs, what elket will such higher
costs have on competition in the downstream market?
Counselors concerned about such issue may wish to exam-
ine, among other things, the proportion of each marker that
the 13213 affects, whether adequate substitute services are or
would be available through other marketplaces, unique char-
acteristics of the excluded firms, and the state of competition
in downstream markets, Counselors may also wish to exam-
ine whether and whett efficiCnciCs support the exclusionary
practices.
Group Buying
Finally, some B213s may permit buyers to save money by
buying inputs for their products as a group. Such group buy-
ing has the potential, depending on the circumstances, to
enhance efficiencies or threaten competition in the markets
for goods traded oit the 1328.
In sonic cases, buyers can save ituney by purchasing
inputs as a group via a B2B because their collective, high-vol-
une buy saves the seller money, savings the seller can pass on
to the buyers. For example, 132Bs may offer joint purchasing
that could force down prices through efficiencies like reduced
paperwork, better planning, or more efficient shipment of the
goods they are buying.
Used improperly, however, joint purchasing can be a tool
for nionopsony, the abuse of market power by buyers. Under
classical tuonopsony theory, buyers with market power may,
under certain conditions, lower the prices they must pay by
limiting their purchases. This can reduce output below com-
petitive levels. Buyers who jointly buy through 13213s and who
exercise such monopsony power may well raise competitive
concerns,
It is not likely that buyers will have such monopsony
power in markets in which they buy only a small fraction of
the goods. For this reason, when buyers jointly purchase
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indirect goods that many other buyers purchase-say, pen-
cils-ir typically raises fewer concerns than their joint pur-
chasing of direct goods-say, specialized machinery-that
the joint purchasers buy more than anyone else. Does the
13211 create buyer power by letting buyers jointly decide what
they plan to buy? Such coordination could be done express-
ly; through an agent, through consulting services, or through
any other feature that lets buyers coordinate their purchases
with each other. (Such information sharing could also facil-
itate collusion among buyers, as noted above.)
Counselors concerned about monapsony may wish to
consider whether new buyers would be likely to enter and
alleviate the problem, and whether safeguards should be
adopted to keep monopsony concerns at bay. Workshop par-
Materials from the Federal Trade Commissions public workshop, Competition
Policy in the World or2B tlectronIc Maqikerplaces (June 2000i, are available
at viw.ft.gov/bc/b2b/Index.him.
2 The authors helped organize and moderate the June 2000 FTC worhshop on
B2Bs and helped draft the Staff Report from the workshop. The Staff Report
Is available at wvn wftc.gov/os/200010/b2brepott.pdf.
'The Issues addressed here are those discussed moost extensively by the work-
shop panelisis.
'Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust
Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, reprinted In 4 Trat Reg.
Rep, (CCH) 13,160,avalable at Av.ti.gov/os/2000/01/ftcdoguldeltnespdf
(Competitor Collaboration Guldellnesl.
Clamp-All v. Cast ion Soil Pipe institute, 851 F.2d 478, 84 (1 st Cir. 1988)
(Breyer. J.).
Secogenerally Competitor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 4, § 3.3Sib).
' See Original Equipment Suppliers Association, Prepared Comment at 7 (sub-
milled in connection with FTC 828 Workshop), available at www,ftcgov/
bc/b2b/commenls).
u Competitor Collaboration Guidelines. supra note 4. 1 3.31(b).
* Id. ("Similarly, other things being equal, the sharing of Information on current
operating ard future business plans is more likely to raise concerns than the
sharing of historical information.").
ricipants discussed plans to keep the market share of the
buying group low or to limit the flow of information among
buyers in the group, for example.
Conclusion
The competitive impact of B2Bs is yet unclear. These arc for-
native times for 13211s, and for that reascn alone, the ques-
tions above are nmre easily posed than 2nswered. Yet prac-
titioncrs who are attcntive to these antitrust issues during
this early stage of 132B development may serve their clients
well. For our part, we will continue to listen to industry,
counsel, and others about the dynamics of B2Bs in order
to learn from them about the competitive effects of 13213
marketplaces. 1 i
:aSee, e.g., United Stales v. Airlirie Tariff Publlshing Co., 58 Fed, Reg. 3971
(1993) (Jan. 12. 1993) (Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive imact
Statement). The case settled through consent decrees that, among other
things, prohibited dissemination of fares that were Intended only to com-
municate planned or contemplated fares or contemplated fare changes.
See United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co.. 836 F Supp, 9 (D.D.C. 1993)
(settlement with two defendantsl): United States v. Airline Tariff Publishing Co.,
1994 WL 502091, 1994 WL 454730 (D.D.C. 1994) settlementwith remain-
Ing defendants).
See generally Conpttilor Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 4. § 3.33.
'Other possible efliciencies attained by exclusivity practices are found in the
Staff Reporl, suipra note 2, Part 3.1.4.
!'lft.
"See also Staff Report, stipra note 2, Part 3.A.3 (oIseussIng provenllnn oI free.
riding as another possible etliciency of exclusion).
r51i to Air Passenger Computer Reservations Systems Antitrust Litigation,
694 F. Supp. 1443, 1450, 1474 (C.D. Cal. 1988), off V, 948 F2d 536 (91h
Cir. 19931).
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